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In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle highlighted the connection between ethics
and politics.1 This intersection between ethics and public policy remains important
more than two thousand years later. For instance, in the stem cell and cloning
debate, the boundaries between science, religion, ethics and politics are often
blurred. The recent adoption of the United NationsDeclaration on Human Cloning
demonstrates the polarization of worldviews on this controversial topic.2
Few scientific discoveries have elicited more enduring concern among scholars,
government officials, and the general public than the permissibility of conducting
research on embryos in general, and human embryonic stem cells (hESC) and
cloning research in particular. Governments are challenged to with the vexing
question of how to balance the therapeutic prospects of hESC and cloning research
with the complex socio-ethical and moral issues involved.
Countries have framed the policy debates surrounding embryo, stem cell and
cloning research differently. The historical, cultural and sociological context, the
institutional framework, and the mobilization of stakeholders are factors that help
explain why countries that seemingly share similar socio-religious beliefs have
adopted diametrically opposite public policies.
* The appendix to this document can be found here: <http://www.stemgen.org>
** Postdoctoral Fellow, Centre de recherche en droit public, Faculte de droit, Universite de
Montreal.
*** Canada Research Chair in Law and Medicine, Professor at the Faculté de droit, Universite
de Montreal and Senior Researcher Centre de recherche en droit public. Corresponding
author: rosario.isasi@umontreal.ca
1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by Chase D. P. (New York: Dover Publications, 1998)
at 229.
2 United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning, GA Res., UNGAOR, 59th Sess., UN Doc.
A/280 (2005).
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Central to the framing of the debate has been the social construction of the
human embryo. The political evaluation of stem cell lines derived from human
embryos necessarily involves determining the moral – and, a fortiori, the
legal—standing of the embryo. However, most national policies regulating embry-
onic and stem cell research lack internal consistency with respect to their views
regarding the moral and legal status attributed to the embryo.
Though embryonic and stem cell research are closely linked to the broader
debate about human cloning, and although government funding of research implicit-
ly encourages such research, few countries have adopted a systematic, compre-
hensive legal and ethical framework governing the regulation of these technologies.
While adopting legislation is often difficult to achieve in this sensitive area,
setting ethical, professional as well as quality and safety assurances and standards
that are reasonable or coherent for all members of a pluralistic society should be
an achievable goal. Otherwise, we risk being entrapped in a dialogue of the deaf,
a policy stalemate, in which market forces undermine democratic processes.3
We maintain that public policies should be designed to adapt to both changing
social circumstances and to scientific progress. However, they often fail to address
issues in a prospective manner. A good example of this is the absence of public
policies addressing the socio-ethical (and legal) issues that potential clinical,
experimental, and therapeutic applications of stem cell and cloning research could
pose. For instance, which safeguards should be in place to ensure that only safe
and effective cell therapies will be brought to the bedside?4 Many governments
justify their public policies based on an alleged scientific consensus that the
potential benefits of hESC and therapeutic/research cloning (as opposed to repro-
ductive cloning) outweigh moral reservations. These governments are further
challenged to deliver results expeditiously in light of heightened public expectations
for cures and treatments, while ensuring protections of the rights of research
3 An example of this is the failure of the United States Congress to adopt legislation regula-
ting embryo research, stem cells and cloning research. Absent federal policy, the private
sector has been largely unregulated and left to market forces. Alice Ouellete, Arthur Caplan
et. al., “Lessons Across the Pond: Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the United
Kingdom and United States” (2005) 31:4, American Journal of Law and Medicine 419-28.
4 Kathleen Lindell & Susan Wallace, “Emerging Issues for Human Stem Cell Medicine”
(2005) 1:1 Genomics, Society and Policy 54-73.
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subjects and patients,5 the recent scandal in South Korea being the most notorious
example.6
Discussions about the ethics of using stem cells derived from embryos will
always persist. Is this an insurmountable problem? Is public policy on morally
contentious issues only feasible when there is a high level of consensus? Can we
overcome this challenge while still respecting democratic principles? A society’s
choice regarding which scientific advances to foster and which to discourage also
reflects its ethical priorities. As Laritzen points out,
“the fundamental question raised by stem cell research is not about the embryo. Instead,
it is about the future toward which biotechnology beckons us. Most succinctly, the question
is: Does contemporary biotechnology, including or perhaps especially stem cell research,
open the door to a posthuman future?”7
This article provides an overview of (I) the moral and legal status of the human
embryo and of the (II) regulatory approaches to embryonic stem cells and cloning
research by comparing the regulatory frameworks of 50 countries.8 The major
goal of this study is to provide and analytical understanding of the policy landscape
5 As noted in a recent editorial: “the drive to be the first one to provide cell lines for therapy
could compromise safety for recipients and could lead this technology into the realms of
quackery.” Peter Braude, Stephen Minger & Ruth Warwick, “Stem Cell Therapy: Hope
or Hype?” Editorial, (2005) 330 BMJ 1159.
6 In two Science papers published in 2004, Dr. Woo Suk Hwang claimed to have created
patient-specific stem cells by somatic cell nuclear transfer (research cloning). Later, on
December 2005, a Seoul National University (SNU) investigative committee issued a report
concluding that Dr. Hwang and his team had fabricated those results. Moreover, the
committee also concluded that Hwang’s had used over 2,000 oocytes for his experiments
and not the 427 oocytes he had claimed. Furthermore, oocyte donors were not properly
informed about the health risks that may result from the donations, some of them were
coerced to donate and 66 of them received financial compensation.
Following the conclusions of the SNU committee – and with the agreement of few of the
authors– the editors of Science decided to retract both papers. The Hwang scandal has
prompted the Korean National Bioethics Committee to reconsider whether to permit further
cloning research.
7 Paul Laritzen, “Stem Cell Biotechnology, and Human Rights: Implications for a Posthuman
Future” (2005) 35:2 Hastings Center Report 31.
8 Australia, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway,
Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Romania, Russia,
South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Tunisia, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Vietnam. The criterion for selection was
based on the adoption of policy regarding embryo, stem cell and/or cloning research.
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around the globe, with an aim to contribute to worldwide policy debates. The
comparison of these policies underscores the hurdles that scientific consortia
involving international jurisdictions and policy frameworks have to confront, as
well as the challenges facing the international harmonization of such policies.
I. The Human Embryo: Moral and Legal Status
Much of the ethical and policy debate has focused on the moral status of the
human embryo. The puzzling question as to whether the human embryo should
be granted full personhood status, or at minimum, be recognized as a potential
person, has no simple answer. The dilemma itself provides an explanation of how
the regulatory models surrounding this issue differ: some countries have used the
moral status criterion explicitly for the framing of public policy,9 while others
have used the criterion implicitly.
It has proven to be difficult to render an account of when human life begins
and what moral –and, a fortiori, legal – status should be ascribed to the human
embryo. In the majority of the countries surveyed, the human embryo has been
bestowed with an intermediate or gradualist moral status; that is, the embryo is
considered more than a simple clump of cells10 but less than a full human person.
Though some recognition is present across the restrictive-liberal policy design
continuum, this view is most compatible with an intermediate policy approach.
Under a gradualist position, embryo research is prima facie ethically acceptable.
Yet it is restricted to a demonstration of the ‘special respect’ or ‘serious moral
consideration’ the embryo is deemed to have due to its potential to become a
human being .11 The language adopted in some policy provisions constitutes
9 E.g., the constitutions of Ireland and Ecuador which maintain the right to life from con-
ception. See also the Costa Rican Supreme Court ruling unconstitutional a decree regulating
human assisted reproductive technologies. Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de
Justicia, Exp. No. 95-0012734-0007-CO (March 3, 1995).
10 E.g. the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) prescribe:
“while there are different views in our community about the moral status of a human
embryo, one that is very widely shared is that embryos are not to be treated as mere tissue.”
National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), Ethical Guidelines on the Use
of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research, (September 2004).
11 Steinbock B., “Respect for Human Embryo” in Laritzen P., ed., Cloning and the Future
of Human Embryo Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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illustrative examples of the special respect conferred on the human embryo.12
For instance, guidelines in India state that, “respect for the embryo’s moral status
can be shown by careful regulation of conditions of research and safeguards”.13
The French National Consultative Ethics Committee recommends that, “the human
embryo must, as soon as it is formed, receive the respect owed to its status,”14
without providing further explanation.
Paradoxically, appeals to ‘human dignity’ as a criterion for embryo policy are
not infrequent.15 For example, Estonian, Finish, Swedish and Swiss policies pro-
hibit “abusing” or “damaging” the embryo with the aim to protect its “dignity”.16
Moreover, guidelines adopted in Japan assert, “human embryos and hES cells shall
be handled carefully and conscientiously without violating human dignity.”17
Australian ethical guidelines prescribe that “respect for the dignity and wellbeing
of the mother and the embryo must take precedence over any expected benefits
of knowledge.”18
12 “…the embryo’s value is symbolic rather than intrinsic or independent. The imprudent,
instrumental use of embryos is prohibited since this might otherwise undermine the
protection of other, more developed forms of human life. This means that the embryo is
entitled to a certain degree of protection, due to ‘importance by association’.” The Health
Council of the Netherlands, The Health Council report on “Stem Cells for Tissue Repair,
Research on Therapy Using Somatic and Embryonic Stem Cells” (2002). And, “All embryos
subjected to research must be treated with respect and are prohibited from being treated
as merchandise.” Comité Consultatif de Bioéthique, Opinion No.18 regarding human
embryo research, (2002).
13 Indian Council of Medical Research, Consultative Document on Ethical Guidelines for
Biomedical Research on Human Subjects, (2000).
14 National Consultative Ethics Committee (CCNE), Opinion (No 67) on the Preliminary
Draft Revision of the Laws on Bioethics, (2001) and Opinion (No 53) on the establishment
of collections of human embryo cells and their use for therapeutic or scientific purposes,
(1997).
15 Timothy Caulfield, Roger Brownsword, “Human Dignity: A Guide to Policy Making in
the Biotechnology Era?”, (2006) Nature Reviews Genetics (7) 72-76. Bartha Knoppers,
“Human Dignity: In Danger of Banality?” (The Case of Cloning), (2005) Case Western
Reserve, Journal of International Law 35(3), 385-395.
16 Estonia – Embryo Protection and Artificial Fertilisation Act, (1997). Finland – Medical
Research Act No. 488, (1999). Sweden – Act 1991:115 on Measures for Purposes of
Research and Treatment Involving Fertilized Human Ova, (amendment in force 1 April
2005). Switzerland – Federal Act on Research on Surplus Embryos and Embryonic Stem
Cells (Embryonic Research Act), (Approved by referendum November 2004).
17 Japan Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Guidelines for
Derivation and Utilization of Human Embryonic Stem Cells, (25 September 2001).
18 National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), Ethical Guidelines on the Use
of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research, (September 2004).
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With the embryo as the locus of ethical (and legal) concern, it is therefore
critically important how the term is defined. Yet many countries have failed to
incorporate a definition of the term ‘embryo’ into their policies or, have provided
a definition that left certain human embryos (e.g. created by somatic cell nuclear
transfer) outside the scope of the legal definition. Moreover, those that have a
definition often lack a consistent and precise use of the term or they rely on a
“circular” definition that contains the same concept that is supposed to be
defined.19
Some countries have defined the embryo by reference to a particular point
in time. For instance, legislation in South Africa, Australia, and Singapore, along
with Indian guidelines, refer to the ‘embryo’ as a human offspring in the first 8
weeks from the moment of conception.20 In Canadian legislation, the embryo
is referred to as a “human organism during the first 56 days of its development
following fertilization or creation.”21 Whereas in other jurisdictions, the embryo
is defined in reference to a broad time frame: a “fertilised ovum at all stages of
development” (Iceland, Estonia, United Kingdom, Finland, South Korea).22 Final-
19 E.g., Australian legislation states that: “a human embryo means a live embryo that has
a human genome or an altered human genome and that has been developing for less than
8 weeks since the appearance of 2 pro-nuclei or the initiation of its development by other
means.” Act No. 145 – An Act to regulate certain activities involving the use of human
embryos, and for related purposes (2002) and the Act No. 144- An Act to prohibit human
cloning and other unacceptable practices associated with reproductive technology, and
for related purpose (2002).Moreover, Estonia’s Embryo Protection and Artificial Fertilisa-
tion Act, 1997 (Amended 2003), Chapter 1, Section 3, states that an “Embryo means an
(human) embryo in its early stage of development from the time of fertilisation of the
ovum.”
20 South Africa – National Health Act, (31 December 2003), Section 1. Australia – Research
Involving Human Embryos Act No. 145, An Act to regulate certain activities involving
the use of human embryos, and for related purposes, (2002). Singapore – Human Cloning
and Other Prohibited Practices Act, (2 September 2004). India – Council of Medical
Research,Consultative Document on Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human
Subjects (2000).
21 An Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction and Related Research, (2004), Art. 3.
22 Iceland – Artificial Fertilisation Act No. 55/1996, (29 May 1996). Estonia – Embryo
Protection and Artificial Fertilisation Act, (1997). United Kingdom –Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act, (1990) (c.37), Article 1 “(a) embryo means a live human embryo
where fertilisation is complete, and (b) references to an embryo include an egg in the
process of fertilisation, and, for this purpose, fertilisation is not complete until the appear-
ance of a two cell zygote.” Finland – Medical Research Act, (1999), Section 2, “Embryo
means a living group of cells resulting from fertilization not implanted into a woman’s
body.” South Korea – Life Ethics Law, (29 January 2004), Article 2, “‘Embryo’ refers
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ly, recognizing that any precise indication of time is always arbitrary, other coun-
tries have opted to define the embryo according to its capacity to develop into
an individual or a human being (e.g. New Zealand, Belgium, Japan and Ger-
many).23
As we will see, attempts to create a moral (and legal) separation between
embryo protection, destruction and use (e.g. for medically assisted procreation,
to derive embryonic stem cell lines or to study cell lines already derived) are often
artificial and lack moral consistency.
Probably the most ethically coherent – albeit contentious – policy regarding
embryo protection and use is found in countries adopting a very restrictive policy
framework. Under this approach, embryo research, cryopreservation and destruction
is prohibited (e.g. Austria, Ireland and Italy).24 Certainly, this assessment does
not take into account the medical (e.g. health) and broader social consequences
arising from these policies. Indeed, here, all embryos created through assisted
reproductive techniques must be implanted, regardless of medical indication or
the couples’ wishes.
In most of the jurisdictions surveyed, regardless of their policy design, there
are provisions mandating the destruction of cryopreserved embryos (created either
for reproductive and/or research purposes) after the expiration of the statutory
storage period,25 or at the embryo donor’s request.26
Though the destruction of embryos after long storage periods is often inevitable
due to safety concerns, the ethical consistency of provisions that forego their
donation for reproductive purposes, or for its use in research, while at the same
time claiming to confer a ‘special respect’ to the human embryo is questionable.
Allowing childless couples to procreate or, using embryos for ethically approved
and scientifically sound research would be the most appropriate way to grant
‘serious moral consideration’ to human embryos already created for reproductive
to a fertilized egg (or segmented cell) from the moment of fertilization to the point of
time at which all organs of the given organism have developed embryologically.”
23 New Zealand – Human Reproductive Technology Act No. 92, (2004). Belgium – Law on
research on human embryos in vitro, (April 2003). Japan – Japan Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Guidelines for Derivation and Utilization of
Human Embryonic Stem Cells, (25 September 2001). Germany – The Embryo Protection
Law, (1990).
24 Austria – Federal Law of 1992 (Serial No. 275) regulating medically assisted procreation
(the Reproductive Medicine Law), (1993). Ireland – Irish Constitution 1937 (as amended
in 1983). Italy – Medical Assisted Procreation Law No. 40, (19 February 2004).
25 The length of storage varies widely, ranging from 5 (e.g. Iceland, Norway, South Korea,
Sweden and United Kingdom) to 15 years (e.g. Finland). See e.g.Estonia, Finland, Greece,
Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, UK Canada, Iceland, Japan and South Korea.
26 E.g. Canada , Switzerland, and UK.
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purposes.27 Otherwise, ethical consistency would mandate the adoption of policies
that avoid the existence of supernumerary embryos by limiting or regulating their
creation through assisted reproductive technologies.
Moreover, irrespective of moral and legal embryo status, another additional
safeguard to the prohibition on developing a human embryo beyond 14 days from
fertilization – or until the formation of the primitive streak – , is that a number
of jurisdictions explicitly require the destruction of embryo after the aforementioned
period.28
Regardless of attempts to legislate it away, direct or indirect inducement and
complicity are necessarily involved in the research enterprise. The special respect
or moral value attributed to the human embryo in most of the public policies
surveyed would be considered morally consistent when such policies also require
a scientific and ethical justification for embryo use and destruction.29
II. Regulatory Approaches
Two approaches shape emerging policy trends: a public and a private public
ordering approach. A public ordering approach involves state-led initiatives to
frame emerging biotechnologies. Due to the different regulatory systems adopted
throughout the world, it is difficult to make broad generalizations about the current
legitimacy or acceptability of hESC in both public and private ordering systems.
These systems are a reflection of the legal traditions, cultural and socio-religious
beliefs, and economic interests which inform and shape public policy on embryonic,
27 Legislation adopted in Estonia, Finland, Greece, Slovenia. Sweden, UK, Canada, Japan
and South Korea allow for the donation of embryos for research when no longer needed
for reproductive purposes or after the expiration of their statutory storage period. In
Switzerland the Embryonic Research Act (2004) explicitly allows the donation of ‘excess’
or supernumerary embryos for stem cell derivation. In this order of ideas, the Portuguese
National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences in “Opinion No. 44/CNECV/04 on Assisted
Medical Reproduction” (July 2004) states:
“The National Council has taken the position that research with no benefit for the embryo
concerned is illegitimate. Exceptionally, when no other alternative than the destruction
of the embryo is possible, scientific research with no benefit to the embryo could be
conducted for the benefit of humanity.”
28 E.g. Australia, Canada, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Japan,
Slovenia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
29 For example, Israeli guidelines require that “the research and possible applications (of
the research) be justified in terms of the benefit that it offers to humanity’. Report from
the Bioethics Advisory Committee of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities,
The Use of Embryonic Stem Cells for Therapeutic Research ,(8 August 2001).
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cloning, and stem cell research. Those traditions, values and interests “operate
symbiotically in the crafting of legislative parameters for stem cell and cloning
science.”30
Within this category, legislative approaches can range from liberal to restrictive
(both of which use administrative oversight), and usually involve criminal pro-
hibitions. For example, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and the United
Kingdom, with different degrees of permissiveness and oversight, have enacted
comprehensive laws regulating and setting conditions for embryonic, stem cell,
and cloning research. However, even among public ordering countries that have
adopted statutory requirements in relation to oversight and enforcement mechanisms
for hESC research and cloning research, we will see that there are significant
differences as well as similarities.
Other countries have opted for a private ordering approach through self-regula-
tion, thus permitting these technologies if they follow professional guidelines, often
set by national bioethics committees. The regulation of embryonic stem cell and
cloning research in India, Israel, and China are examples of a private ordering
approach since these countries have adopted professional guidelines.
The following analysis of the 50 countries under study demonstrates a mix
of private-public ordering approaches in the case of human embryonic research.
Before turning to embryonic research specifically, it should be noted that the debate
on human reproductive cloning is without a doubt influential in the framing of
policy responses. Indeed, an emerging pattern found in all these countries is to
adopt prohibitions on the reproductive cloning of human beings and/or embryos.
The debate that took place at the United Nations on the adoption of an international
instrument banning human reproductive cloning indicates that an effective con-
sensus exists among the 191 U.N. member states regarding human reproductive
cloning. This consensus deems human reproductive cloning “ethically repugnant
and contrary to human rights and dignity.”31
In terms of national policies, all countries surveyed (45 by national laws32
30 Angela Campbell, “Ethos and Economics: Examining the Rationale Underlying Stem Cell
and Cloning Research Policies in the United States, Germany and Japan” (2005) 31
American Journal of Law and Medicine, 85.
31 Supra note 2. For a review of the United Nations process, see Rosario M. Isasi, George
J. Annas, “Arbitrage, Bioethics and Cloning: The ABCs of Gestating a United Nations
Cloning Convention” (Fall 2003) 35:3 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
397-414.
32 See legislation in: Australia, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand,
Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Romania,
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and 5 by national guidelines33) prohibit the reproductive cloning of human beings,
while a smaller number ban human cloning for research or therapeutic purposes
(32 by national laws34 and 5 by national guidelines35). The aforementioned pro-
hibitions adopt a variety of approaches,36 from banning “upstream”37 or “down-
stream”38 cloning to criminalizing it entirely.39 Moreover, in countries where
therapeutic human cloning is not explicitly addressed it can still be banned through
prohibiting the creation of embryos for research purposes40 or through a positive
injunction that allows embryonic research only for therapeutic purposes for the
embryo.41
Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Kingdom and Vietnam.
33 See national guidelines in: China, India, Taiwan, Tunisia and the United States.
34 See legislation in: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and The Netherlands.
35 China, India, Taiwan, Tunisia and United States.
36 George J. Annas, Lori B. Andrews & Rosario M. Isasi, “Protecting the Endangered Human:
Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations” (2002)
28 Am. J. Law & Med. 154-157.
37 “Upstream” policies prohibit human cloning regardless of its purpose. For instance,
Lithuania’s Law of Biomedical Research No. VIII-1679 (2000) states that “cloning of a
human being shall be prohibited,” while Panama’s Law No. 3 Human Cloning Prohibition
(2004), forbids “in all forms the promotion, financing and/or donating, using public funds
or private investments, of experiments, research and developments of all forms of human
cloning.”
38 In public policies that apply “downstream” methods, embryos or gametes that have been
subjected to research are prohibited from being implanted. For example, in Australia’s
Prohibition of Human Cloning Act No. 144 (2002), doing research on gametes and embryos
is not banned as such, but it is forbidden to create a human embryo other than by fertiliza-
tion, implantation, and carrying to term such embryo. Another example is found in legis-
lation adopted in New Zealand (Act on Human Assisted Reproductive Technology, 2004)
and Germany (Federal Embryo Protection Law, 1990) where both the implantation and
the development of a cloned or genetically altered human embryo is prohibited.
39 Legislation in Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, New
Zealand, Spain, South Africa, Switzerland, Sweden, Germany, Slovakia, Israel, Italy, and
France establish criminal sanctions for using, creating, developing or implanting a human
embryo in contravention to their laws, as well as for the conduct of certain research and
interventions.
40 Moreover, some countries, such as Cyprus, Ireland, Georgia, Portugal and Slovakia, prohibit
the creation of human embryos for research purposes and for the procurement of stem
cells through the ratification of the 1997 Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine.
41 See e.g. Austria’s Federal Reproductive Medicine Law (1992).
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It is striking that a negligible number of countries have adopted national laws
(6) or guidelines (1) specifically allowing human cloning for therapeutic or research
purposes.42 Still, the majority of countries worldwide have no explicit policy
regarding research cloning.
In relation to human embryonic research generally, where public policy has
been adopted, the majority of countries allow research on human embryos or
gametes under strict conditions (16 countries by national laws,43 7 by guide-
lines44), while a few countries explicitly prohibit research on embryos by law.45
The remaining (21) countries surveyed have no explicit policy on embryonic re-
search.
An interesting pattern is evident in the regulation of human embryonic stem
cell research: where public policy has been adopted, the majority of countries allow
the procurement of hESC lines and research on supernumerary embryos (16
countries by law,46 4 by guidelines47). In addition, only 8 countries explicitly
prohibit by law the procurement of hESC from surplus embryos and subsequent
research.48 A very small number of countries prohibit research on embryos to
create hESC lines but allow the importation of hESC lines (e.g. Germany,49
France50). The remaining countries surveyed have no explicit policy regarding
hESC research.
Having briefly surveyed the “cloning” landscape, we can identify three
approaches as characterizing emerging policy trends in the broad area of research
into human reproduction.51 In categorizing countries according to their policy
design, we found that the majority of countries that have adopted public policies
on embryonic, stem cell, and cloning research could be labelled “intermediate”52
42 Belgium, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden and United Kingdom (by law)and Israel
(by national guidelines).
43 See for example legislation in Iceland, Latvia and Lithuania.
44 See e.g. India and Taiwan.
45 Austria, Ireland, Cyprus, Costa Rica and Italy by law.
46 Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, New Zealand,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and The Netherlands.
47 China, India, Taiwan and the United States.
48 Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Italy, Austria, Ireland, Costa Rica, and Slovak Republic.
49 Act ensuring the protection of embryos in connection with the importation and utilization
of human embryonic stem cells (Stem Cell Act), (28 June 2002).
50 Bioethics Law No. 2004-800, (6 August 2004).
51 Knoppers BM, “Reflections: The Challenge of Biotechnology and Public Policy” (2000)
45:2 McGill Law J. 559-566.
52 Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Latvia, Greece, Estonia, Finland, Hungary,
New Zealand, Spain, South Africa, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Portugal, India, United
States, Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Panama, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Tunisia, and Vietnam.
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(b); while the minority of countries are at the edge of the spectrum, meaning they
adopt either a restrictive53 (a) or a liberal54 (c) public policy approach. Finally,
since 2002, an emerging pattern in the legal landscape reveals a move towards
the liberalization of national policies55 across the restrictive-liberal spectrum.
However, some countries have still opted to pass very restrictive laws.56
a) Restrictive Policies
In a restrictive policy framework, many techniques are prohibited (i.e. reproductive
and therapeutic cloning, embryonic research) via tight regulations or blank pro-
hibitions.57 These countries58 advocate strong government intervention and have
a very critical attitude towards scientific discoveries. A closer scrutiny of the
principles underlying their policies demonstrates that restrictive policies, in general,
aim to strongly protect the human embryo. Their goal is to protect human life
(and dignity) and society at large from the potential negative effects and presumed
dangers of these technologies (e.g. instrumentalisation and commodification of
potential human life, as well as the exploitation of women and children).59
We can further sub-divide restrictive policies into 3 types: namely, policies
prescribing the impermissibility (prohibition) of human embryonic stem cell
derivation, the impermissibility of using hESC lines or their products, though some
53 Iceland, Lithuania, Denmark, Slovenia, Germany, France, Ireland, Georgia, Taiwan, Austria,
Italy, Norway, Poland, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Panama.
54 Belgium, China, Japan, Israel, Singapore, South Korea and United Kingdom.
55 E.g. Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Brazil, Japan, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom. This trend
toward liberalization of policies is also noted in proposed legislation currently under debate
(e.g. Czech Republic, France, Malta, Mexico, Spain and Ukraine).
56 E.g. Italy, Panama and Colombia.
57 E.g., legislation adopted in Austria, Georgia and Italy prescribe that fertilized human
oocytes and cells may be used only for medically assisted procreation. Moreover, in
Slovakia, “research without medical indication is not permitted on human embryos or
fetuses.”
58 Supra note 45.
59 For example, Lithuania’s Law on Ethics of Biomedical Research No. VIII-1679, (11 May
2000), states in its preamble that “biomedical research must be conducted according to
the principle whereby the interests of the human being prevail over the interests of society
and science.” Whereas, the purpose of Norway’s Biotechnology Law (Law No. 100 of 5
December 2003 on the Use of Biotechnology in HumanMedicine) is “to ensure that medical
applications of biotechnology are utilized for the benefit of everyone in an inclusive society.
This shall be done in accordance with the principles of respect for human dignity, human
rights and personal integrity (…).”
MIND THE GAP 21
exceptions exist for imported hESC lines; and finally, the impermissibility of
government funding.
Policies under the first type ban all embryonic research, with the possible
exception of treatment beneficial to that particular embryo or treatments necessary
to achieve a pregnancy (e.g. Italy,60 Austria61). In all practicality this constitutes
a ban and, thus, research migrates elsewhere (sometimes to countries where there
is minimal ethical oversight).
The second type attempts to satisfy all sides by setting a cut-off date after
which stem cells may not be taken from surplus embryos, but permits research
on stem cells that were derived before the cut-off date, and then, only when they
come from outside the country. This compromised approach found in France62
and Germany63 for example, is a partial antidote to prohibition. Still, these policies
set a dubious ethical standard by deeming unethical both embryo use and the
derivation of embryonic stem cell lines from embryos from the home country while
allowing the importation of embryonic stem cell lines derived elsewhere.
Finally, under the third type, the state cannot allow or use public funds for
certain activities. This approach, found in the restrictions on federal government
funding in the USA, is problematic because it sets two standards for the governance
of research. In some cases the private sector is then left unregulated, thus constitu-
ting in reality a “laissez-faire” policy.64
Under the last two sub-typologies of restrictive approaches, governments, while
presenting themselves as virtuous protectors of ethics and morality by withholding
direct involvement on embryo destruction, set artificial boundaries in order to
60 The Italian Medical Assisted Procreation Law No. 40 (2004) stipulates that clinical and
experimental research on a human embryo can be conducted only for therapeutic or
diagnostic purposes which are exclusively directed to the protection of the embryo’s health
and development, and when no other technologies are available.
61 Federal Law of 1992 (Serial No. 275) regulating medically assisted procreation (the
Reproductive Medicine Law), and amending the General Civil Code, the Marriage Law,
and the Rules of Jurisdiction, June 4, 1992, (1993) 44 no. 2 Int. Dig. Hlth. Leg. 247.
62 Bioethics Law No. 2004-800, (6 August 2004).
63 Act ensuring the protection of embryos in connection with the importation and utilization
of human embryonic stem cells (Stem Cell Act), (28 June 2002).
64 The United States constitutes the best example of this “laissez-faire” approach with its
unregulated private sector (with the exception of some state laws such as in California,
New Jersey and Massachusetts).
(See, The National Institute of Health, National Human Genome Research Institute, Policy
and Legislation Database http://www.genome.gov/PolicyEthics/LegDatabase/pubsearch.cfm)
The disadvantage of the “laissez-faire” approach is that it precludes oversight for safety/
quality concerns and provokes regulatory arbitrage—seeking overseas venues to avoid
local research regulation.
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benefit from practices that are deemed unethical. Thus, it is clear why these policy
approaches are deemed hypocritical as they rest their ethical grounding on the
lack of ethics elsewhere. For instance, if the importation of embryonic stem cell
lines is allowed because somebody else has destroyed embryos, are the importers
not complicit in the destruction of embryos?
b) Intermediate Policies
As mentioned above, the majority of countries surveyed fall under the intermediate
policy approach.65 Hereunder, a wide range of techniques are allowed but con-
trolled and closely monitored by modest state intervention. Under this approach,
stem cell research on supernumerary embryos from IVF treatment is permitted,
but the creation of embryos specifically for research purposes is prohibited.66
The overall goal of these policies is to provide efficient and safe mechanisms
for conducting research. New Zealand’s Act on Human Assisted Reproductive
Technology No. 92, 2004 provides an illustrative example of these goals by stating
that its purpose is, “to provide a robust and flexible framework for regulating and
guiding the performance of medical assisted reproductive procedures and the
conduct of human reproductive research.” Similar rationale is found in India’s
Council of Medical Research Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on
Human Subjects (2000), which state, “any system of ethical guidelines on research
needs to be cognizant of, and informed by, a sensitive balance of the risks and
benefits” for society.
Intermediate policies are often the result of political compromises and trade-offs
and seek to balance diverse – if not conflicting – interests and values that could
otherwise thwart the adoption of any legal framework. Because of this, they are
at risk of being ambiguous and internally inconsistent. The latter is commonly
reflected in policies granting moral and legal status to the human embryo, and
in policies regulating embryo destruction following research or medically assisted
reproduction.
c) Liberal Policies
Finally, in liberal policies, most technologies are permitted provided procedural
rules and governance are observed. These policies permit the creation of embryos
65 Supra note 44.
66 E.g. Canada, Denmark, Estonia and Australia.
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for research purposes as well as for the derivation of stem cell lines and for
research cloning (mostly by de facto or by case-by-case approval by a govern-
mental agency or licensing authority). Yet, even under this more permissive
approach, human reproductive cloning is banned.67
The overall goal of liberal policies is to promote scientific and medical progress
with the belief that it is beneficial to humanity. At the same time these policies
seek to regulate the interest of patients and the public health, in addition to address-
ing societal concerns68 (e.g. Singapore,69 South Korea,70 United Kingdom,71
and Japan72). Unfortunately, these policies usually “fail to explicitly enunciate
the value-choices underlying their acceptance or to explain why certain constraints
have been instituted.”73
The challenge for countries adopting a liberal policy framework is to provide
a coherent, transparent and flexible, yet enforceable, system that also takes into
67 E.g. Belgium, Sweden and the UK.
68 Régnier M-H, Knoppers BM, “International Initiatives” (2002) 11:1 Health Law Review
67-71.
69 “The BAC also believes that the recommendations strike a proper balance between allowing
research with tremendous potential therapeutic benefits to mankind to proceed while
affording a measure of respect and level of protection to human embryos which takes into
consideration the diversity of views on the status of the human embryo.” Bioethics Advisory
Committee of Singapore (BAC), Report “Ethical, Legal and Social Issues in Human Stem
Cell Research, Reproductive and Therapeutic Cloning, (21 June 2002).
70 The South Korean Bioethics and Biosafety Act No. 7150 (2005), “aims to enhance the
health of human beings and the quality of human life by creating conditions that allow
for the development of life sciences and biotechnologies that can be used to prevent or
cure human diseases. Additionally, this Act aims to protect human dignity and to prevent
harm to human beings by ensuring that these life sciences and biotechnologies are devel-
oped safely and in accordance with the principles of bioethics.”
71 “The object of the HFEA Code of Practice is … to secure the safety or efficacy of parti-
cular clinical or scientific practices. It is concerned with areas of practice which raise
fundamental ethical and social questions. In framing the Code of Practice, the HFEA has
been guided both by the requirements of the HFEA Act and by:
- The respect which is due to human life at all states of development.
- A recognition of the benefits, both to individuals and to society, which can flow from
the responsible pursuit of medical and scientific knowledge”.
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Code of Practice, 6th Edition, 2003.
72 For instance, Japan’s Law Concerning Regulation Relating to Human Cloning Techniques
and Other Similar Techniques, (June 2001), while allowing a wide range of technologies,
including cloning for research purposes, recognizes that cloning and other similar tech-
niques, “could have a severe influence on preservation of human dignity, safety for human
life and body, and maintenance of social order.”
73 Knoppers B.M., Hirtle M. et. al., “Genetic Technologies: Commercialization of Genetic
Research and Public Policy” (17 December 1999) 286:5448 Science 2277-2278.
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account opposing socio-cultural and ethical values or beliefs. Moreover, when
governance depends on regulatory agencies that decide on a case-by-case basis,
there is flexibility but also the risk of arbitrary applications or inconsistencies;
and if governed by guidelines or professional codes alone, without active monitor-
ing and sanctions, the risk is to end up as self-serving and following a market-
consumer model.
Conclusion
At first glance, the determination of the moral status of the human embryo influ-
ences possible responses to questions of the permissibility of, restrictions on, and
prohibitions on embryonic research. No matter what policy framework is
adopted—whether liberal, intermediate or restrictive—the mechanisms for assessing
and regulating embryonic, stem cell and cloning research must keep pace with
the scientific discoveries. They must also address ethical concerns, with a flexible
and transparent regulatory system able to both prospectively cover new scientific
advances, to regulate both private and public funds to ensure against double
standards, and finally to be enforceable. “Good” guidelines are useless if they can
be disregarded with impunity.
In an era of globalize science, common scientific, regulatory and ethical
standards are necessary. These (minimal) common denominators are required to
foster collaboration in stem cell research (and its future therapeutic applications)
at the national and international levels. Most importantly, harmonization of these
standards is needed to avoid negative repercussions for health, safety, and patient
rights.74 Yet, considering the multiplicity of laws and guidelines already in exist-
ence, the lack of moral and legal consistency within these documents, and the
politics involved in the embryo debate, the harmonization of scientific, regulatory
and ethical standards will be very difficult.
The consequences of discord are too high to allow the inconsistency to con-
tinue. If the idealistic pursuit of knowledge and the desire to improve health are
not sufficient motivation for international discussion and harmonization, perhaps
the spectre of a dialogue of the deaf, with market forces driving progress on this
ethically sensitive issue will bring stakeholders to the discussion table.
Aristotle warned humanity that ethics and politics are connected. Two thousand
years later, we have yet to move beyond that observation. Advances in science
force us to determine whether morally contentious issues require consensus,
74 D.B. Resnik. “The Need for International Stem Cell Agreements” (October 2004) 22:10
Nature Biotechnology 1207.
MIND THE GAP 25
compromise and political conviction. Can we address such divisive issues while
holding intact our democratic principles and socio-cultural values? In short, the
challenges is to defend the integrity of ethical and legal principles – the sooner
the better.
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